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Abstract

We study what useful implications strategic complementarity or substitutability may have when the indifference relations need not be transitive. Two results are obtained about the existence of a monotone selection from the best response correspondence when both strategies and parameters form chains. Two more results are obtained about the existence of a Nash equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities where strategy sets are chains, but monotone selections from the best response correspondences need not exist.



Item Type: MPRA Paper -

Original Title: Strategic complementarity and substitutability without transitive indifference-

Language: English-

Keywords: Strong acyclicity; interval order; single crossing; monotone selection; Nash equilibrium-

Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games-





Autor: Kukushkin, Nikolai S.

Fuente: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20714/







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