Régulation dun duopole et RandD environnementale Report as inadecuate




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Abstract

We develop a three stage game model composed of a regulator and two firms. These firms compete on the same market where they offer the same homogeneous good, and can invest in RandD to lower their emission-output ratio. By means of a tax per-unit of pollution and a subsidy per-unit of RandD level, the regulator can induce the first best outcome, when the marginal cost of production is increasing. This is not the case when the marginal cost of production is constant.



Item Type: MPRA Paper -

Original Title: Régulation d-un duopole et RandD environnementale-

English Title: Regulation of a duopoly and environmental RandD-

Language: French-

Keywords: Duopole; Taxe d-émission; Subvention de RandD; Optimum de premier ordre; Coût marginal croissant.-

Subjects: H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H21 - Efficiency ; Optimal TaxationD - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D62 - ExternalitiesO - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O3 - Innovation ; Research and Development ; Technological Change ; Intellectual Property Rights > O32 - Management of Technological Innovation and RandDC - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games-





Author: Ben Youssef, Slim

Source: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20596/







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