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Abstract

Delayed perfect monitoring in an in�nitely repeated discounted game is studied. A player perfectly observes any other player-s action choice with a fixed, but finitedelay. The observational delays between different pairs of players are heterogeneous and asymmetric. The Folk Theorem extends to this setup, although for a range of discount factors strictly below 1, the set of belief-free equilibria is reduced under certain conditions. This model applies to any situation in which there is a heterogeneous delay between information generation and the players-reaction to it.



Item Type: MPRA Paper -

Original Title: Delayed Perfect Monitoring in Repeated Games-

Language: English-

Keywords: Repeated Game, Delayed Perfect Monitoring, Folk Theorem-

Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative GamesC - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games-





Autor: Kinateder, Markus

Fuente: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20443/







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