Competition, Agency and Productivity.Reportar como inadecuado

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Reference: Mark Rogers, (2004). Competition, Agency and Productivity. International Journal of the Economics of Business, 11 (3), 349 - 367.Citable link to this page:


Competition, Agency and Productivity.

Abstract: This article tests a set of hypotheses relating to agency and Schumpeterian views on how competition affects performance. A survey data set of Australian workplaces is used, with the change in labour productivity as the dependent variable. The results show strong support for the idea that intense competition raises productivity growth in managerial workplaces, but not in non-managerial workplaces (i.e. where the principal owner also works). Testing the agency theories in more detail, we find no evidence that the number of competitors, the price elasticity of demand or a proxy for bankruptcy (pre-tax losses) are the mechanisms behind the process. For non-managerial workplaces the results indicate support for the idea that greater demand uncertainty reduces productivity growth. In contrast, for managerial workplaces, greater demand uncertainty tends to raise productivity growth.

Bibliographic Details

Host: International Journal of the Economics of Businesssee more from them

Issue Date: 2004Identifiers


Urn: uuid:1ba9e70a-4f67-4f82-8866-42d682001dcd Item Description

Type: info:eu-repo/semantics/article;

Language: en


Autor: Mark Rogers - - - - Bibliographic Details Host: International Journal of the Economics of Business see more from them - Issue Dat



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