One world and the many sciencesReportar como inadecuado

One world and the many sciences - Descarga este documento en PDF. Documentación en PDF para descargar gratis. Disponible también para leer online.

Reference: Melnyk, Andrew., (1990). One world and the many sciences. DPhil. University of Oxford.Citable link to this page:


One world and the many sciences Subtitle: A defence of physicalism

Abstract: The subject of this thesis is physicalism, understood not assome particular doctrine pertaining narrowly to the philosophyof mind, but rather as a quite general metaphysical claim tothe effect that everything is, or is fundamentally, physical.Thus physicalism explicates the thought that in some sensephysics is the basic science. The aim of the thesis is todefend a particular brand of physicalism, which I calleliminative type physicalism. It claims, roughly, that everyproperty is a physical property – a property mentioned in thelaws of physics, and hence that any putative property notidentifiable with a physical property must be eliminated fromour ontology.Eliminative type physicalism is apt to face three objections,and so my thesis, like Caesar's Gaul, falls into three parts.In the first, I argue against the idea that there are tenablepositions, both physicalist and non-physicalist, alternative toeliminative type physicalism. I argue that each of thesepositions – token physicalism (Fodor, middle Putnam),supervenience physicalism (Lewis, Horgan) and and anon-physicalist view I call pluralism (Goodman, late Putnam) – is defective. In the second part, responding to the objectionthat there is just no reason to be a physicalist, I develop apositive argument for eliminative type physicalism, an argumentresting upon a strong version of the explanatory test forreality according to which only explanatorily indispensableproperties can justifiably be said to exist. In the third andfinal part, I argue, against the charge that eliminative typephysicalism cannot accommodate what I call phenomenalproperties (qualia, raw feels etc.), that there is no goodreason to deny, and one good reason to affirm, that phenomenalproperties just are physical properties.

Type of Award:DPhil Level of Award:Doctoral Awarding Institution: University of Oxford Notes:The digital copy of this thesis has been made available thanks to the generosity of Dr Leonard Polonsky

Bibliographic Details

Issue Date: 1990Identifiers

Urn: uuid:43e135f1-3786-41b4-918a-81e80b02d492

Source identifier: 602328329

Source identifier: 602328330 Item Description

Type: Thesis;

Language: eng Subjects: Logical positivism Tiny URL: td:602328329


Autor: Melnyk, Andrew. - institutionUniversity of Oxford facultyFaculty of Literae Humaniores - - - - Bibliographic Details Issue Date:



Documentos relacionados