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Reference: Richard Mash, (2000). Host Country-Foreign Investor Bargaining Power and Investment Incentive Provisions in Multilateral Investment Agreements. Department of Economics (University of Oxford).Citable link to this page:

 

Host Country-Foreign Investor Bargaining Power and Investment Incentive Provisions in Multilateral Investment Agreements. Series: Discussion paper series

Abstract: The paper is concerned with foreign investment in developing countries and theincentives offered to attract that investment in relation to the use of a possible future multilateralinvestment agreement as a commitment device over incentive levels. The existing literature hasidentified two sources of benefit from such commitment, firstly to avoid time inconsistencyproblems whereby incentives are less effective than otherwise because investors fear that theymay be reduced once sunk costs have been incurred, and secondly to avoid excessive competitionfor foreign investment. This paper demonstrates a third benefit from commitment which arisesfrom low host country bargaining power when negotiating incentive levels with foreign investors.If bargaining power is low, incentives agreed under bargaining will be generous to the investorand host country welfare will be lower than otherwise. It is shown that this consequence of lowbargaining power may be avoided if host countries can commit themselves in advance toprovisions that limit the incentives they may subsequently agree with foreign investors. It isargued that provisions of this kind should be optional from a host country perspective since thosewith low bargaining power will gain from them but those with high bargaining power would not.

Bibliographic Details

Issue Date: 2000Identifiers

Urn: uuid:5c300da9-b52b-41e7-aff8-2802ea62179b Item Description

Type: info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper;

Language: en Tiny URL: ora:1084

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Autor: Richard Mash - - - - Bibliographic Details Issue Date: 2000 - Identifiers Urn: uuid:5c300da9-b52b-41e7-aff8-2802ea62179b - - - It

Fuente: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:5c300da9-b52b-41e7-aff8-2802ea62179b



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