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Reference: D Myatt and C Wallace, (1999). Sophisticated Play by Idiosyncratic Agents. Nuffield College (University of Oxford).Citable link to this page:


Sophisticated Play by Idiosyncratic Agents. Series: Economics Working Papers

Abstract: The payoffs of a symmetric 2x2 coordination game are perturbed by agent-specific heterogeneity. Individuals observe a (possibly sampled) history of play, which forms the initial hypothesis for an opponent's behaviour. Seedings beliefs in this manner, they iteratively reason toward a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Realised actions augment history and context evolves. Both risk-dominance and generalised risk-dominance determine equilibrium selection as heterogeneity vanishes. When sampling is sufficiently incomplete, the risk-dominant equilibrium is played irrespective of the history observed.

Bibliographic Details

Issue Date: 1999Identifiers

Urn: uuid:6eb22624-ac84-4d66-98eb-6b81432be3a9 Item Description

Type: info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper;

Language: en


Autor: D Myatt - - - C Wallace - - - - Bibliographic Details Issue Date: 1999 - Identifiers Urn: uuid:6eb22624-ac84-4d66-98eb-6b81432be3



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