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Reference: Lisa Chauvet, Paul Collier and Andreas Fuster, (No date). Supervision and project performance: a principal-agent approach.Citable link to this page:

 

Supervision and project performance: a principal-agent approach

Abstract: This paper applies and extends principal-agent theory to analyze the performance of donor projects. As in many situations, there is variation in the degree of divergence between the interests of the donor (the principal) and the recipient government (the agent). Further, the effort expended on supervision of the agent is a control variable. We first present a principal-agent model that shows that conditional on optimal contracting, the marginal effect of more precise supervision on the likelihood of project success is higher the wider the divergence of interests. We then test this prediction using data on project performance. We are able to measure the degree of divergence between donor and recipient interests, as perceived by the donor, through a donor classification system of recipient governments. Consistent with the theory, we find that donor supervision of projects is significantly more effective in improving project performance where interests are widely divergent.

Publication status:Not PublishedPeer Review status:Not peer reviewedVersion:Author's OriginalNotes:NEEO

Bibliographic Details

Issue Date: No dateIdentifiers

Urn: uuid:7c8c7237-b2c9-4bc0-b89d-6b09d2ec19eb Item Description

Type: Research paper;

Language: en

Version: Author's OriginalKeywords: aid principal-agent theory donor projectsSubjects: Development economics Tiny URL: ora:1682

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Autor: Dr Lisa Chauvet - websitehttp:-www.dial.prd.fr-dial presentation-dial equipe chercheurs.htm institutionIDR-DIAL, Paris - - - Prof

Fuente: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:7c8c7237-b2c9-4bc0-b89d-6b09d2ec19eb



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