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Reference: Abigail Barr and Danila Serra, (2008). The effects of externalities and framing on bribery in a petty corruption experiment.Citable link to this page:

 

The effects of externalities and framing on bribery in a petty corruption experiment Series: CSAE working paper series

Abstract: Using a simple one-shot bribery game, we find evidence of a negative externalityeffect and a framing effect. When the losses suffered by third parties due to a bribe being offered and accepted are high and the game is presented as a petty corruption scenario instead of in abstract terms bribes are less likely to be offered. Higher negative externalities are also associated with less bribe acceptance. However, framing has no effect on bribe acceptance, suggesting that the issue of artificiality first raised by Bardsley (2005) may be of particular importance in bribery experiments.

Publication status:PublishedPeer Review status:Not peer reviewedVersion:Author's Original

Bibliographic Details

Issue Date: 2008

Copyright Date: 2008 Identifiers

Urn: uuid:c5b2293b-0313-4e7c-a31d-c6c8ea37947d Item Description

Type: Working/Discussion paper;

Language: en

Version: Author's OriginalKeywords: corruption economic experiment social preferences JEL: D73 JEL: C91 JEL: Z13Subjects: Economics Microeconomics Econometrics Africa Tiny URL: ora:2540

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Autor: Abigail Barr - websitehttp:-www.economics.ox.ac.uk-index.php-staff-barr- institutionUniversity of Oxford facultySocial Sciences D

Fuente: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:c5b2293b-0313-4e7c-a31d-c6c8ea37947d



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