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Reference: Jeremy Bulow and Paul Klemperer, (2009). Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?. American Economic Review, 99 (4), 1544 - 1575.Citable link to this page:


Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?

Abstract: We compare the most common methods for selling a company or other asset when participation is costly: a simple simultaneous auction, and a sequential process in which potential buyers decide in turn whether or not to enter the bidding. The sequential process is always more efficient. But pre-emptive bids transfer surplus from the seller to buyers. Because the auction is more conducive to entry - precisely because of its inefficiency - it usually generates higher expected revenue. We also discuss the effects of lock-ups, matching rights, break-up fees (as in takeover battles), entry subsidies, etc.

Publication status:PublishedPeer Review status:Peer reviewedVersion:Accepted ManuscriptNotes:Copyright © by the American Economic Association. Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of American Economic Association publications for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not distributed for profit or direct commercial advantage and that copies show this notice on the first page or initial screen of a display along with the full citation, including the name of the author. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than AEA must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. The author has the right to republish, post on servers, redistribute to lists and use any component of this work in other works. For others to do so requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Permissions may be requested from the American Economic Association Administrative Office.

Bibliographic Details

Publisher: American Economic Association

Publisher Website: http://www.aeaweb.org/

Host: American Economic Reviewsee more from them

Publication Website: http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/

Issue Date: 2009-01-01Identifiers

Urn: uuid:d9251c6c-a549-4aaa-ab4e-960ca9ad827f

Doi: https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.4.1544 Item Description

Type: info:eu-repo/semantics/article;

Language: en

Version: Accepted Manuscript


Autor: Jeremy Bulow - - - Paul Klemperer - institutionUniversity of Oxford - - - - Bibliographic Details Publisher: American Economic As

Fuente: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:d9251c6c-a549-4aaa-ab4e-960ca9ad827f


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