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Reference: Zhang, J, Chen, N, Deng, X et al., (2012). Incentive ratios of Fisher markets.Citable link to this page:

 

Incentive ratios of Fisher markets

Abstract: In a Fisher market, a market maker sells m items to n potentialbuyers. The buyers submit their utility functions and moneyendowments to the market maker, who, upon receiving submitted information,derives market equilibrium prices and allocations of its items.While agents may benefit by misreporting their private information, weshow that the percentage of improvement by a unilateral strategic play,called incentive ratio, is rather limited—it is less than 2 for linear marketsand at most e1/e ≈ 1.445 for Cobb-Douglas markets. We furtherprove that both ratios are tight.

Peer Review status:Peer reviewedPublication status:PublishedVersion:Accepted ManuscriptConference Details: Automata, Languages, and Programming : 39th International Colloquium, ICALP 2012, Warwick, UK, July 9-13, 2012, Proceedings, Part IINotes:Copyright © 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31585-5_42.

Bibliographic Details

Publisher: Springer Berlin Heidelberg

Publisher Website: http://www.springer.com/

Host: Automata, Languages, and Programming : 39th International Colloquium, ICALP 2012, Warwick, UK, July 9-13, 2012, Proceedings, Part IIsee more from them

Publication Website: http://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-642-31585-5

Issue Date: 2012

pages:464-475Identifiers

Urn: uuid:dda40eca-dcfa-42fc-8360-5f089557e2a0

Isbn: 978-3-642-31584-8

Isbn: 978-3-642-31585-5

Source identifier: 574317

Doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31585-5_42

Issn: 0302-9743 Item Description

Type: Conference;

Version: Accepted Manuscript Tiny URL: pubs:574317

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Autor: Zhang, J - institutionUniversity of Oxford Oxford, MPLS, Computer Science - - - Chen, N - - - Deng, X - - - Zhang, H - - - - Bibl

Fuente: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:dda40eca-dcfa-42fc-8360-5f089557e2a0



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