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Reference: David P Myatt and Chris Wallace, (2006). When Does One Bad Apple Spoil the Barrel? An Evolutionary Analysis of Collective Action. Department of Economics (University of Oxford).Citable link to this page:

 

When Does One Bad Apple Spoil the Barrel? An Evolutionary Analysis of Collective Action. Series: Discussion paper series

Abstract: This paper studies n-player collective-action games in which a public good is produced if and only if m or more volunteers contribute to it. Quantal-response strategy revisions allow play to move between equilibria in which a team of m players successfully provide, and an equilibrium in which the collective action fails. A full characterisation of long-run play reveals the determinants of success. These include the correlation between players' costs of provision and their valuations for the good. The addition of an extra bad apple player can spoil the barrel by destabilising successful teams. A contemporary application is the team-based provision of open-source software. The analysis reveals the features of successful open-source projects, and suggests a rationale for limiting the pool of possible contributors.

Bibliographic Details

Issue Date: 2006Identifiers

Urn: uuid:e92b7d04-1022-455d-8924-88dbfc05fb39 Item Description

Type: info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper;

Language: en Tiny URL: ora:1308

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Autor: David P Myatt - - - Chris Wallace - - - - Bibliographic Details Issue Date: 2006 - Identifiers Urn: uuid:e92b7d04-1022-455d-8924-

Fuente: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:e92b7d04-1022-455d-8924-88dbfc05fb39



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