Evolutionary Debunking Arguments.Report as inadecuate




Evolutionary Debunking Arguments. - Download this document for free, or read online. Document in PDF available to download.

Reference: Kahane, G, (2011). Evolutionary Debunking Arguments. Nous, 45 (1), 103-125.Citable link to this page:

 

Evolutionary Debunking Arguments.

Abstract: Evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs) are arguments that appeal to the evolutionary origins of evaluative beliefs to undermine their justification. This paper aims to clarify the premises and presuppositions of EDAs-a form of argument that is increasingly put to use in normative ethics. I argue that such arguments face serious obstacles. It is often overlooked, for example, that they presuppose the truth of metaethical objectivism. More importantly, even if objectivism is assumed, the use of EDAs in normative ethics is incompatible with a parallel and more sweeping global evolutionary debunking argument that has been discussed in recent metaethics. After examining several ways of responding to this global debunking argument, I end by arguing that even if we could resist it, this would still not rehabilitate the current targeted use of EDAs in normative ethics given that, if EDAs work at all, they will in any case lead to a truly radical revision of our evaluative outlook.

Peer Review status:Peer reviewedPublication status:PublishedVersion:Publisher's version Funder: Wellcome Trust   Notes:Copyright 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Re-use of this article is permitted in accordance with the Terms and Conditions set out at http://wileyonlinelibrary.com/onlineopen.

Bibliographic Details

Publisher: Wiley

Publisher Website: http://www.wiley.com/

Journal: Noussee more from them

Publication Website: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1468-0068

Issue Date: 2011-3

pages:103-125Identifiers

Urn: uuid:f6a510ba-2d47-4956-80cf-70e7069dd87a

Source identifier: 191921

Eissn: 1468-0068

Doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00770.x

Issn: 0029-4624 Item Description

Type: Journal article;

Language: eng

Version: Publisher's version Tiny URL: pubs:191921

Relationships





Author: Kahane, G - institutionUniversity of Oxford Oxford, HUM, Philosophy, Philosophy NonPostholders - - - - Bibliographic Details Publ

Source: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:f6a510ba-2d47-4956-80cf-70e7069dd87a



DOWNLOAD PDF




Related documents