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This paper explores two ideas to enhance the performance of agri-environmental contracting schemes: linking contract payments to environmental outcomes and putting the contracts up for tender. This paper investigates whether there are any gains to be had by combining the benefits of both approaches. Controlled lab experiments were run in two countries, systematically varying the rate at which payments are linked to environmental outcomes. This paper clarifies the conditions under which the benefits from combining tenders with incentive payments outweigh the costs.

Keywords: Conservation tenders ; auctions ; incentive contracts ; agricultural policy ; environmental policy ; market-based instruments ; experimental economics ; Auktionen ; Ausschreibungsverfahren ; Agrar-Umweltverträge ; Agrar-Umweltpolitik ; Anreizverträge ; experimentelle Ökonomie

Variant title: AUSSCHREIBUNGSVERFAHREN FÜR ERGEBNISORIENTIERTE AGRAR-UMWELTVERTRÄGE

Subject(s): Agribusiness

Agricultural and Food Policy

Agricultural Finance

Demand and Price Analysis

Political Economy

Issue Date: 2011

Publication Type: Conference Paper/ Presentation

PURL Identifier: http://purl.umn.edu/114523

Total Pages: 13

Record appears in: German Association of Agricultural Economists (GEWISOLA) > 51st Annual Conference, Halle, Germany, September 28-30, 2011





Autor: Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe ; Schilizzi, Steven ; Breustedt, Gunnar

Fuente: http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/114523?ln=en



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