Statutory Rewards to Environmental Self-Auditing: Do They Reduce Pollution and Save Regulatory Costs Evidence from a Cross-State Panel Reportar como inadecuado




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State-level statutes provide firms that engage in environmental self-audits, and that self-report their environmental violations, with a variety of different regulatory rewards, including immunity from penalties and privilege for information contained in self-audits. This paper studies a panel of State-level industries from 1989-2003, in order to determine the effects of the different statutes on toxic pollution and government inspections. We find that, by encouraging self-auditing, privilege and limited immunity protections tend to reduce pollution and government enforcement activity; however, more sweeping immunity protections, by reducing firms' pollution prevention incentives, raise toxic pollution and government inspection oversight.

Subject(s): Environmental Economics and Policy

Issue Date: 2008

Publication Type: Conference Paper/ Presentation

PURL Identifier: http://purl.umn.edu/6204

Total Pages: 37

Series Statement: Selected Paper

467771

Record appears in: American Agricultural Economics Association (AAEA) > 2008 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2008, Orlando, Florida





Autor: Guerrero, Santiago ; Innes, Robert

Fuente: http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/6204?ln=en







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