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Grapevine leafroll disease (GLRD) presently threatens the grape and wine industry worldwide. We develop a cellular automata model of GLRD diffusion and control in two ecologically-connected, independently-managed vineyards. One vineyard produces high-value wine grapes whereas the other produces low-value wine grapes. Disease management is modeled as a two-agent bargaining game. We show that under nooncooperative disease management, it is optimal for neither vineyard manager to control the disease. We consider the case of cooperative disease management and compute the benefits accruing from cooperation. We find it optimal for the manager of the high-value vineyard to pay the low-value vineyard manager to exit production. We determine the size of a Pareto-efficient side payment that can remedy the negative spatial externality emerging from noncooperative disease control.

Keywords: Bargaining games ; Bioeconomic Models ; Cellular Automata ; Computational Methods ; Externality ; Disease Control ; Grapevine Leafroll Disease ; Side payment ; Spatial-Dynamic Processes

Subject(s): Crop Production/Industries

Farm Management

Research Methods/ Statistical Methods

Issue Date: 2013

Publication Type: Conference Paper/ Presentation

PURL Identifier: http://purl.umn.edu/151144

Total Pages: 33

JEL Codes: C63; C71; C72

Record appears in: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association (AAEA) > 2013 Annual Meeting, August 4-6, 2013, Washington, D.C.





Autor: Atallah, Shady S. ; Gómez, Miguel I. ; Conrad, Jon M.

Fuente: http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/151144?ln=en







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