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We specify an oligopoly game, where firms choose quantity in order to maximise profits, that is strategically equivalent to a standard Tullock rent-seeking game. We then show that the Tullock game may be interpreted as an oligopsonistic market for influence. Alternative specifications of the strategic variable give rise to a range of Nash equilibria with varying levels of rent dissipation

Keywords: Tullock contests ; oligopoly

Subject(s): Marketing

Production Economics

Issue Date: Sep 11 2009

Publication Type: Working or Discussion Paper

PURL Identifier:

Total Pages: 11

JEL Codes: C7; D72

Series Statement: Risk and Uncertainty Program


Record appears in: University of Queensland > School of Economics > Risk and Sustainable Management Group Working Papers

Autor: Menezes, Flavio ; Quiggin, John


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