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The paper examines the relationship between the innovator’s patenting and patent breadth decisionsas well as how these two decisions affect, and are affected by, the innovator’s ability to enforce herpatent rights. An important feature of the model is that the entrant may be able, by his choice oflocation in product space, to affect the innovator’s decision to defend her patent. An interestingfinding of the paper is that the innovator might find it optimal to patent her innovation even whenshe chooses to not defend her patent by invoking a trial when patent infringement occurs. The paperalso shows that, in most cases, the greater is the entrant’s R&D effectiveness, the smaller is theinnovator’s incentive to patent her product. If patenting occurs, however, the greater is R&Deffectiveness, the greater is the patent breadth that could be chosen without triggering infringement.

Keywords: patent breadth ; entry deterrence ; patent infringement ; patent validity

Subject(s): Public Economics

Issue Date: 2006

Publication Type: Conference Paper/ Presentation

PURL Identifier: http://purl.umn.edu/139933

Total Pages: 44

JEL Codes: L20; L13; O34

Record appears in: Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society (AARES) > 2006 Conference (50th), February 8-10, 2006, Sydney, Australia





Autor: Yiannaka, Amalia ; Fulton, Murray E.

Fuente: http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/139933?ln=en







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