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Exploration of an exhaustible resource with cost recovery under asymmetric information about cost is modeled and analyzed employing Principal-Agent theory. Allocation of lower than full information level of effort for the high-cost firms is found socially optimal. However, distortion is less in a two-stage process of exploration and extraction.

Subject(s): Resource /Energy Economics and Policy

Issue Date: 2006

Publication Type: Working or Discussion Paper

PURL Identifier: http://purl.umn.edu/28578

Total Pages: 18

Series Statement: Working Paper WP 06-05

Record appears in: University of Maryland > Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics > Working Papers





Autor: Helal, Uddin ; Rahman, Shaikh Mahfuzur

Fuente: http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/28578?ln=en



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