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In this paper we present a two stage game of political lobbying for policies designed to enhanceenvironmental quality. Unlike previous work which has tended to assume perfect monitoring ofenvironmental quality in lobbying games we allow for imperfect monitoring of environmental quality.We characterize perfect public (politico-economic) equilibria in the game for the case of both perfectand imperfect monitoring of environmental quality and compare these with imperfect privatemonitoring of environmental quality. Results are discussed with respect to farmer behaviour in thecontext of non-point source pollution and implications for the political consequences of farmextension programmes highlighted.

Keywords: Game theory ; public choice ; imperfect public monitoring ; imperfect private monitoring ; non-point source pollution ; agricultural extension ; public education

Subject(s): Environmental Economics and Policy

Issue Date: 2007

Publication Type: Conference Paper/ Presentation

PURL Identifier: http://purl.umn.edu/10391

Total Pages: 32

Series Statement: Conference Paper

Record appears in: Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society (AARES) > 2007 Conference (51st), February 13-16, 2007, Queenstown, New Zealand





Autor: Beard, Rodney ; Mallawaarachchi, Thilak ; Salerno, Gillian

Fuente: http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/10391?ln=en







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