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Fixed-rent tenancy was traditionally regarded as equally efficient as owner-cultivators.The counter-example is, however, presented here. Specifically, tenants with fixed-rent contractsand well protected by tenancy regulations may, in the long run, tum out to be lessefficient than other farmers (e.g., owner-cultivators and informal tenants), particularly whenthey do not heavily depend on farm revenue as major source of family income. On the otherhand, tenants who are not benefited from tenancy regulations might not be less efficient thanowner-cultivators. The underlying implication is tenancy reform is not a panacea forimproving farming efficiency; it may result in many negative effects in the long run.

Subject(s): Farm Management

Labor and Human Capital

Issue Date: 1991-06

Publication Type: Journal Article

PURL Identifier: http://purl.umn.edu/172719 Published in: Agricultural Economics: The Journal of the International Association of Agricultural Economists, Volume 05, Issue 2 Page range: 121-133

Total Pages: 14

Record appears in: International Association of Agricultural Economists (IAAE) > Agricultural Economics: The Journal of the International Association of Agricultural Economists





Autor: Huang, Chung-Huang

Fuente: http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/172719?ln=en







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