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Abstract: Matching markets play a prominent role in economic theory. A prime example ofsuch a market is the sponsored search market. Here, as in other markets of thatkind, market equilibria correspond to feasible, envy free, and bidder optimaloutcomes. For settings without budgets such an outcome always exists and can becomputed in polynomial-time by the so-called Hungarian Method. Moreover, everymechanism that computes such an outcome is incentive compatible. We show thatthe Hungarian Method can be modified so that it finds a feasible, envy free,and bidder optimal outcome for settings with budgets. We also show that insettings with budgets no mechanism that computes such an outcome can beincentive compatible for all inputs. For inputs in general position, however,the presented mechanism-as any other mechanism that computes such an outcomefor settings with budgets-is incentive compatible.



Autor: Paul Dütting, Monika Henzinger, Ingmar Weber

Fuente: https://arxiv.org/







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