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Topoi

pp 1–11

First Online: 25 November 2016

Abstract

The aim of this article is to draw a sketch of an ontology for Realist Non-Naturalist Cognitivists. A distinction is made between moral property-universals and moral property-particulars. It is argued, first, that moral property-universals have the same ontological status as non-moral property-universals; second, that moral property-universals have many instances in the spatio-temporal world; third that these moral property-instances or -particulars have the same ontological status as non-moral property-particulars.

KeywordsMoral property Moral laws Ontological status Parfit’s non-metaphysical cognitivism Light moral ontology  Download fulltext PDF



Autor: Bruno Niederbacher

Fuente: https://link.springer.com/







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