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Review of Philosophy and Psychology

pp 1–18

First Online: 25 November 2016

Abstract

An important challenge to color objectivists, who hold that statements concerning color are made true or false by objective non-subject-involving facts, is the argument from interpersonal variation in where normal observers locate the unique hues. Recently, an attractive objectivist response to the argument has been proposed that draws on the semantics of gradable adjectives and which does not require defending the idea that there is a single correct location for each of the unique hues Gómez-Torrente 2016 Noûs 501: 3–40,. In Hansen 2015, I argued that the recent objectivist response doesn’t apply to comparative occurrences of color adjectives, so a revised, comparative, version of the argument from interpersonal variation remains a powerful objection to certain types of objectivism. In this paper, I address several unsatisfactory objectivist replies to the comparative version of the argument from interpersonal variation, and offer what I think is a more plausible objectivist reply to the comparative argument from interpersonal variation.

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Autor: Nat Hansen

Fuente: https://link.springer.com/







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