Farewell to the luck and Mind argumentReport as inadecuate

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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 156, Issue 2, pp 199–230

First Online: 13 July 2010


In this paper I seek to defend libertarianism about free will and moral responsibility against two well-known arguments: the luck argument and the Mind argument. Both of these arguments purport to show that indeterminism is incompatible with the degree of control necessary for free will and moral responsibility. I begin the discussion by elaborating these arguments, clarifying important features of my preferred version of libertarianism—features that will be central to an adequate response to the arguments—and showing why a strategy of reconciliation often referred to as -deliberative libertarianism- will not work. I then consider four formulations of the luck argument and find them all wanting. This discussion will place us in a favorable position to understand why the Mind argument also fails.

KeywordsFree will Moral responsibility Libertarianism Luck argument Mind argument Rollback argument Robert Kane Peter van Inwagen  Download fulltext PDF

Author: Christopher Evan Franklin

Source: https://link.springer.com/

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