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SERIEs

, Volume 2, Issue 4, pp 431–446

First Online: 15 March 2011Received: 17 February 2011Accepted: 28 February 2011

Abstract

We study a problem of individual manipulation in an impartial culture IC framework using computer modeling. We estimate the degree of manipulability of ten positional voting rules in the case of multiple choice for 3 and 4 alternatives.

KeywordsManipulability Positional voting rules Multiple choice Extended preferences JEL ClassificationD7  Download to read the full article text



Author: Fuad Aleskerov - Daniel Karabekyan - M. Remzi Sanver - Vyacheslav Yakuba

Source: https://link.springer.com/







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