Euclidean preferences, option sets and strategyproofnessReport as inadecuate




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SERIEs

, Volume 2, Issue 4, pp 469–483

First Online: 23 July 2011Received: 12 December 2010Accepted: 08 June 2011

Abstract

In this note, we use the technique of option sets to sort out the implications of coalitional strategyproofness in the spatial setting. We also discuss related issues and open problems.

KeywordsSocial choice Strategyproofness Voting We are grateful to Salvador Barbera for the many stimulating scientific conversations we had over years and very pleased to offer him this little contribution which has remained unpublished. M. Le Breton would like to point out that his own interest for strategyproofness has been very much influenced by his very nice 1990 paper with Bezalel Peleg.

Our dear friend Georges Bordes passed away in 2005. He was a very good person, a talented scholar and a friend of Salvador. He would have been very happy to offer this little present to his friend.

We would like to thank an anonymous referee for an extremely careful reading of an earlier version of this manuscript. We would also like to thank Jérome Renault and John Weymark for a very useful correspondence.

JEL ClassificationD71 D72 D78  Download to read the full article text



Author: Georges Bordes - Gilbert Laffond - Michel Le Breton

Source: https://link.springer.com/







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